The overriding aim of reconstruction programmes should be to make people more resilient to future risks and change. That 
The Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004 was a disaster on an unprecedented scale and elicited local and international responses that went well beyond the experience of previous disasters. It required responses on a very large scale and brought new actors onto the relief and reconstruction scene. This provided a test-bed for new and established approaches to relief and reconstruction. The response to the huge Kashmir earthquake of 2005 added to that experience.
The scale and frequency of disasters have increased in the past and are likely to increase further, as a result of e.g. climate change, urbanisation and persistent poverty. The increase in hydrometereological disasters is particularly significant. It is essential to improve the capabilities of communities and institutions alike to both mitigate risks and build back better.
Natural disasters are becoming more frequent and are affecting growing numbers of people 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 People-centred approaches can help achieve this through both product and process. The links between development, vulnerability and disasters were first clearly identified by Wijkman and Timberlake in 1984. Disasters of similar magnitudes have much greater impact on poor countries than rich ones and, within countries, the poor are generally more affected than the rich. The poor in developing countries are particularly at risk of disasters, because they lack the resources to build better, do not always have the right skills, knowledge or information, and often have to make do with dangerous sites to build on, e.g. steep slopes at risk of landslides, or alluvial plains at risk of flooding or liquefaction. And amongst the poor, women are more at risk than men, because they often have less of a voice, own less assets, have less physical strengths, and are sometimes hampered by their clothes.
Understanding how and why people built as they did before a disaster can highlight underlying vulnerabilities and capabilities, as well as strengths and weaknesses in construction. Some of the most successful reconstruction projects and programmes adopted vernacular skills and technologies with a good disaster record.
The crucial role played by local actors in disaster mitigation and reconstruction has been recognised since the 1980s by agencies including Practical Action (then ITDG), as described by e.g. Maskrey (1989) , using the example of Peru. This echoed findings in the informal housing sector there from a decade or so before (Turner (1976) . Both show that the people's participation in construction or reconstruction is important; it empowers them, builds their capabilities and makes them more resilient.
Notwithstanding all the losses and distress they cause, disasters generate opportunities as well, particularly if they are large scale and lead to a significant humanitarian response. The ensuing influx of external finance generates ample scope to address some of the weaknesses and resuscitate local markets and livelihoods. Unfortunately, such opportunities are often wasted in practice.
Agencies will need to reflect seriously on the above lessons, before deciding how to rebuild in Haiti after the 2010 earthquake. We now turn to examine these issues in more detail.
The poor suffer more in disasters and have a harder time recovering from them
When an earthquake measuring 6.9 on the Richter scale struck San Francisco on October 17th, 1989, it killed 62 people, affected 3,757 and caused 5.6 billion US dollars of damage. A few years later, on September 30th, 1993, a somewhat weaker earthquake, measuring 6.4, hit Maharashtra in India, killing 9,748, affecting over 30,000 and causing 280 million of US dollars of damage, including 171,000 houses. On January 12th, 2010, an earthquake measuring 7.0 on the Richter scale struck Haiti, killing an estimated 222,570, and affecting 3.7 million people, many of those in the shanty towns of Port-au-Prince. Less than two months later, on February 28th, one of the strongest earthquakes ever, measuring 8.8., hit Concepción in Chile. Data are still sketchy, but most victims seem to have been caused by an ensuing tsunami; it is unlikely that the quake itself killed more than 1,000 people. All these earthquakes hit very populated areas; the huge differences in their impact are due to variations in poverty and vulnerability of the people living in those areas.
The differentiated impact of disasters on men and women is primarily caused by existing gender inequalities. Statistics show that natural disasters and their impacts kill on average more women than men, and kill women at an earlier age than men. Whilst women survive as well as men in societies with equal rights, where these do not exist, they can suffer badly; e.g. of the 140,000 people that died from cyclones in Bangladesh in 1991, 90% were women. (Aguilar, 2009) More resistant housing can often be developed from local technologies The poor are more vulnerable to disasters...
The bulk of low-income housing in developing countries is built by the poor themselves. The constraints they face in doing so are largely responsible for their vulnerability to disasters and also for their vulnerability in the reconstruction process.
First, the poor often build on hazardous sites, exposing themselves to flooding, landslides, settlement and liquefaction, as well as disease vectors. Such hazardous areas are often worse hit by disasters.
Second, livelihoods of the poor, whether rural or urban, are often more vulnerable to disasters and, more importantly, the poor have fewer resources to recover their livelihoods. Thus, poverty compounds the effects of disaster.
... but the poor are also more vulnerable in the reconstruction process
Although reconstruction creates an influx of resources for development, this may not work equally well for everyone. Successful reconstruction calls for inclusive and integrated thinking.
Vulnerable livelihoods are often a barrier to individuals and society recovering from a disaster. Looked at another way, housing reconstruction generally takes place before livelihoods reconstruction and often ignores its needs. If reconstruction doesn't do enough to rebuild livelihoods, the poor may well end up worse off than before. Support in the reconstruction of housing stock from the state or international agencies is often limited to those who can prove title to land or buildings. This excludes or discriminates against tenants and squatters -groups which form a high percentage of the poor in most developing countries.
When money starts coming in, it is frequently captured by an elite, people who have the influence, connections and knowledge to deal with the bureaucracies in place.
Where immediately after the disaster, poor and rich were working together towards recovery, as soon as serious resources come in, this may put them in different camps, and the poor may lose their position and influence in the group.
Fifty years of approaches to housing
It is important to develop a good understanding of the housing sector in a disaster location, when preparing for reconstruction. This is in the first place because the context (including policies, strategies, rules and regulations, culture, skills,
The lack of secure tenure can exclude people
Post-tsunami reconstruction in Sri Lanka had two components: an Owner-Driven Programme (ODP), allowing people to rebuild on their own plots, outside a buffer zone, and a Donor Assisted Programme (DAP) for people who were living within the buffer zone and had to be relocated.
The ODP targeted owners of land and property only. This created problems for tenants, squatters on private land and for extended families where titles perhaps had not been subdivided. At the end of 2008, for instance, there were still over 500 of such families living in transitional camps in Colombo district alone, faced with the risk of eviction. Whilst the government reconstruction agency, RADA, recognised this as a challenge and did propose a third phase of housing assistance to deal with it, this never happened due to the large caseload and restrictions in funding.
Within the DAP, however, a different approach was taken. Persons living within the buffer zone before the tsunami were assisted on the basis of humanitarian needs alone. Thus, squatters on government reservations fared better, especially in Colombo, Batticaloa and Trincomalee. The authorities provided them either with a plot in a relocation site, or with cash to buy a plot elsewhere, after which they were entitled to support under the ODP. (Hidellage and Usoof, 2010) The poor often build their houses on hazardous sites Figure 2 . These houses built on unstable terraces on steep slopes in peri-urban Lima will be very vulnerable to earthquakes © Practical Action, Colin Palmer access to materials, land and finance etc.) that defines housing will also apply to reconstruction. Secondly, that same context is an important factor in how houses behave when a hazard strikes, and why that hazard may become a disaster. And thirdly, there is lengthy experience with residents playing central roles in realising regular housing, which reconstruction processes can build upon. In rural areas, poor people have always built their own houses, and rural housing often has a rich tradition. Housing designs and technologies have been passed on and improved upon by generations of rural builders. They often include measures to mitigate the impact of disasters, born from experience, and these must inform reconstruction.
Many rural communities also have builders specialised in specific components of construction. The quality of rural housing varies with local skills and materials. Durability may be a problem, since many natural materials are easily affected by humidity and insects. Wellbuilt and maintained rural housing has proven to resist low-to medium-intensity disasters but most remains vulnerable to major disasters. Rural housing and livelihoods are often closely linked, with houses being designed to e.g. store agricultural produce, keep livestock, or accommodate agro-processing.
The production of housing in urban areas is more complex. It is less easy for the urban poor to build housing themselves, because it is hard to access land, natural materials are less available, and construction is more monetised. Some therefore revert to renting and others become squatters. High rates of urbanisation have contributed to huge housing backlogs over the past decades.
Governments have attempted for fifty years to tackle these backlogs by building houses for people. However standards were far too high and the urban poor could not afford them, unless they were subsidised; production costs were high and output was a fraction of the need.
Mama Susan builds a house and a livelihood in town
Mama Susan Taplokoi Maina lives in one of the spontaneous settlements that have sprung up around Nakuru in Kenya. Practical Action first came across her in 1997, when she was about 60 years old. She had lost her husband, and of the six children she had with him, four died young. She had managed to buy a plot with her savings and the help of others, and was living in a single-roomed house made of timber off-cuts and galvanised iron sheets. Her main income came from selling second-hand clothes and vegetables in the market. As she was getting older, she did not want to end up being a burden on her children. She needed a more secure income that could help her to improve her house.
Using some of her income from sales, she extended the house to add a single room that she rented out. The rental income helped her to build another room, and another. The more rooms she built, the more her income increased. By 2003, she was letting 12 rooms, at about $7 per month. From this, she managed to raise the capital to invest in materials to build a better house for herself.
For many years, Mama Susan has been a member of a self-help group, initiated to improve the neighbourhood. They also started to discuss how their houses could be improved. They finally opted to build their walls with stabilised soil blocks, and Practical Action worked with the group to build their capacity to do so. Mama Susan now lives is a much better and larger house on her own plot. When the limitations of public sector housing supply became clear, in the 1970s, international agencies such as the World Bank promoted the provision of serviced sites and sometimes a core house, to be completed by the owners in time. However, the sites and services programmes suffered from similar limitations and failed to reach large numbers of the urban poor. The approach was abandoned in the late 1980's, to be replaced by approaches which see authorities as enablers of housing processes in the private sector. Urban housing processes thus changed from being 'supply-driven' to being 'supportdriven', a clear sign that authorities and agencies had begun to value people-centred housing processes.
Of course, these processes have always been there, often with the urban poor in the driving seat, building the informal settlements that started to sprawl in and around towns and cities. Popular urban housing is often built over many years, in an incremental process of extensions and improvements as resources become available, providing owned and rented homes. The case of Mama Susan, is an interesting one, in that it explains how those housing processes may happen, and some people end up as landlords. For Mama Susan, her housing became an important part of her livelihood strategy; many other people will have home-based enterprises; and for others again the location of their house is important for being close to livelihood opportunities. Official strategies to improve the living conditions in informal settlements have tended to focus on upgrading the services, leaving housing to the owners.
Low-income urban housing is often built without regard to standards and on dangerous sites. When disasters hit towns and cities, it tends to be more heavily affected.
Slowly changing approaches to reconstruction…
In 1970, major earthquakes struck Peru and Turkey, causing much damage and many casualties. In both cases, the government initiated large reconstruction programmes, often involving relocation, and received assistance form external humanitarian agencies on an unprecedented scale. The approaches followed by governments and agencies alike were to build houses for people rather than with them. And they had important flaws: many of the houses built remained unoccupied, and affected people reverted to their old ways of building, remaining vulnerable to future risks (see, e.g. Aysan and Oliver (1987) and Blaikie (1994) . This approach to reconstruction, which had agencies in the driving seat, is often termed DDR: Similar houses for different families, located away from livelihoods 
Donor-Driven Reconstruction (DDR).
It has been much studied since 1970, and many of those studies have concluded that DDR has important drawbacks. The most important ones are listed in the box overleaf. The overall conclusion of all these is that DDR should not be recommended, except for cases where very little local building capacity remains. Tragically, forty years on, governments and agencies sometimes still adopt centralist approaches, and houses remain unoccupied even now. Disasters do put a lot of pressure on decision makers. They lead to thousands of people living in makeshift accommodation or with host families, and nobody likes that to last for too long. If nothing happens quickly, the media will put on additional pressure. So now, as in 1970, decisions are frequently made in a hurry, without much investigation or analysis or without involving all those that matter. It appears to remain difficult for some decision makers to shift from a supply-driven 'relief mode' to a 'reconstruction mode' that ought to be much more support-driven and people-centred.
A move in the right direction has been the emergence at scale of Owner-Driven Reconstruction (ODR), about a decade ago in Asia. The approach itself was not new; it had been supported largely by NGOs on smaller scales for several decades, especially in Latin America. What perhaps influenced the greater interest and scaling up are the changes in housing policies and strategies, from supplydriven to support-driven, over the years. Thus, more agencies recognised the major role played by home owners in the production of houses under normal circumstances, and queried why reconstruction after disasters should happen in such a different way. They therefore gave a much more prominent role to property owners in reconstruction, and reserved a more supporting role for themselves. In this approach, the majority of reconstruction happened on the original plots, enabling owners to make use of the original infrastructure (if that was not damaged) and to make a quicker start.
ODR generally is more successful than DDR, e.g. it is quicker, cheaper and more satisfying to the owners. The key advantages of ODR over DDR are summarised alongside. Ownerdriven reconstruction is now becoming more widespread, and that has given rise to a number of variations within it, particularly where it comes to who is more in the driving seat: owners or agencies. Unfortunately, a number of agencies appear to confuse owner-driven with ownerbuilt reconstruction. Whilst they may label their projects ODR, they may take major decisions regarding design, technology choice, quality and standards themselves, perhaps with only minor consultation of the owners, but then leave it to the owners to build those houses. Owner-driven is not synonymous with owner-built. A post-tsunami reconstruction project in Aceh, for instance, changed from owner-built to contractor-built housing, because the owners lacked key building skills. However, communities were involved in all major decisions on the project, so it remained largely owner-driven. (Da Silva and Batchelor, 2010) .
ODR has generally been more successful where agencies were prepared to leave more of the driving to the owners. But ODR can also have weaknesses; these are summarised alongside. The main criticism has been that, by focusing on owners only, it is an exclusive approach, that perhaps leaves the most marginalised unattended. It has therefore proven to be particularly problematic in urban reconstruction, where there are relatively more non-owners. The
Comparison of ODR and DR

Drawbacks of DDR:
1. Contractors prefer to build many uniform houses on large sites, but households needs differ. 2. There is a lack of user-participation at all stages; solutions are therefore often inappropriate and residents do not feel ownership. 3. It takes a lot of time to acquire, plan for and service large plots. 4. Such sites are often far from trunk infrastructure, leading to additional connection and transport costs. 5. This manner of building is costly, yet the contribution to the local economy may only be limited. 6. Many projects involve the relocation of residents from their original sites; this may threaten their livelihoods. 7. Information sharing is poor in general. 8. Projects can be exclusive or gender-biased. 9. At times, quality control by agencies or inspectors is inadequate, leading to poor construction and vulnerability to future hazards. (Ruskulis, 2008) Common advantages of ODR over DDR: 1. Owner-satisfaction is higher. 2. Construction is quicker. 3. ODR is cheaper for agencies, because owners add other resources; thus, agencies are able to help more people within their budgets. 4. There is greater incorporation of livelihood needs, as owners are more involved in key decisions. 5. The ODR process strengthens social capital and skills and can empower individuals and communities. 6. Quality can often be better than in DDR, but that depends on the available skills, information and support.
Challenges to ODR:
1. The approach focuses on legal owners and thus excludes those who cannot prove ownership, renters and squatters. 2. Standards set by agencies for reconstruction may be beyond what owners can maintain once the aid dries up. 3. To achieve the right construction quality may require quite a lot of capacity building, something that is often lacking. 4. Agencies sometimes label their projects as ODR, where in reality they take most of the major decisions, and reserve only the building role for the owners. 5. Agencies fail to provide adequate technical support for the level of participation they are monitoring. 6. Like in DDR, agencies often ignore and bypass local financial and government institutions, undermining long term sustainability. (Schilderman, 2010, pp. 29-31) ODR: Houses to suit individual families, on their own plots rest of this paper therefore focuses on PeopleCentred Reconstruction (PCR), distancing itself from methods which focus on existing owners only.
Guiding principles for reconstruction
1. Support and empower communities to recover, rebuild and become resilient.
2. In particular, invest in training, of communities, local builders and local authorities. Where possible, use local training colleges and build their capacity to provide and continue the training, to prepare for future disasters.
3. Work with affected communities to plan their rebuilding and coordinate the response effectively according to the expressed needs of the communities, and the resources available.
4. Ensure the active participation of all the most vulnerable groups and people in community recovery and give special attention to the needs of people who were tenants or squatters, have lost family members or are disabled.
5. Be firm and realistic about commitments to time-scale. Donors, governments and the media often have unrealistic expectations to get results quickly. This creates pressure for rapid centralised capital expenditure and reduces popular participation.
6. Base the reconstruction plan on a thorough assessment of risks, damage, needs and resources with active community participation.
7. Adopt or improve indigenous construction technologies that have proven to resist the disaster reasonably well, as these are well known and need less capacity building. Provide adequate technical support to ensure appropriate construction quality.
8. Ensure that communities have the capacity to maintain buildings and infrastructure as well as institutions established by the reconstruction process in the future.
9. Avoid relocating households or settlements unless there are critical safety risks, as this moves people away from where they make a living, and may slow down reconstruction as land may be hard to find and the provision of trunk infrastructure can be costly and lengthy.
10. Minimise duration and distance of displacement, when relocation is essential, and ensure transport services.
11. Ensure security of tenure and property rights for affected people, and in particular women.
12. Support the affected population to make informed choices on recovery and reconstruction, recognising the important roles of NGOs and CBOs in promoting information sharing and community-based learning.
13. Prioritise reducing vulnerability and mitigation of potential future disasters through reconstruction.
14. Use reconstruction as an opportunity to rebuild livelihoods and local markets.
15. Where needed, integrate productive or commercial activities in house designs (e.g., grain storage or livestock rearing in rural areas, or small shops or home-based enterprises in urban areas).
16. Ensure fair and transparent distribution of government and agency money and resources for reconstruction, according to needs.
17. Strengthen the resilience of the affected population to future potential disaster risks through awareness raising and participation in contingency and preparedness plans.
18. Prioritise environmental sustainability in recovery and reconstruction because degradation of the environment is quite often an important contributory factor in the occurrence of a disaster.
19. Ensure compliance with reconstruction standards that reduce vulnerability to future disasters, adopting local building regulations and codes that are relevant. Do not set standards too high, as that would make compliance difficult, once reconstruction aid dries up. Consider incremental and affordable housing standards.
20. Advocate for government recognition and support for People-Centred Reconstruction, particularly through enabling policies, strategies, laws and regulations.
21. Monitor achievement of the plans together with affected populations and amend if necessary; build in the flexibility in the reconstruction processes to make changes if they are needed.
22. Evaluate the reconstruction process comprehensively and effectively, together with communities who undertook the rebuilding; use the evaluation to learn lessons, improve processes and change policies.
23. Insist on an independent ombudsman or monitoring unit, to which individual households can take grievances.
From forty years of reconstruction, we have learned that there are a number of principles that reconstruction approaches should adopt in order to best suit the needs of the poor:
Towards People-Centred Reconstruction (PCR)
The overriding aim of reconstruction programmes should be to make people more resilient to risk and change. That does require more than just building safe houses for them. It is also necessary to rebuild their livelihoods. And, above all, it needs people to get involved in rebuilding processes, as these processes help to empower them and make them more resilient. We have called this People-Centred Reconstruction (PCR) PCR recognizes and builds on many of the positive aspects of ODR. But, in putting people at the centre, it also makes two important differences:
• It focuses on all people affected by disasters, not just property owners.
• It recognizes that a true reduction in vulnerabilities comes from making people more resilient to shocks and change, not just from giving them safer buildings to live or work in. In order to achieve PCR at scale, current experience indicates that the following seven components are particularly important: 
Learning from the housing sector
PCR recognizes the important role played in producing housing by its users in non-disaster circumstances, and intends to apply what is good about that to reconstruction. In order to do so successfully, stakeholders involved in reconstruction do need to gain a thorough understanding of how housing was realised in any given reconstruction context, before the disaster struck. They can learn this from talking to residents, local builders, and the professionals and authorities involved. It is particularly important to find out how land is accessed, housing is designed, what the preferred technologies are, whether they include any disaster-resistant features, who gets involved in building and what particular skills they have, how housing is financed and over what period it is built, and what rules and regulations apply and whether or not these are followed.
Although it is tempting in reconstruction to aim for the realisation of complete houses of an appropriate size and standards, one learns from
PCR can happen at scale
The IFRC, South Bank University and Practical Action jointly financed and realised research, a conference and a major publication on Building Back Better. This included an assessment of reconstruction history, as well as 10 detailed studies, by local researchers, of relatively recent reconstruction projects and programmes. The work focused on analysing the potential for implementing People-Centred Reconstruction at scale, and affirmed the practicability of programmes and large projects which allow people support over the reconstruction of their homes, while adopting strategies to reduce social and economic vulnerability, developing a sound building stock rooted in local culture and markets, and increasing institutional capacity -without drowning out the voices of ordinary people. (Lyons and Schilderman, editors, 2010) .
Reconstruction can be incremental and adaptable
Violence following the 2007 elections in Kenya left over 500,000 people displaced, half of whom settled in IDP camps. To help those people return, there was only limited government support available, and little external aid, which would not be adequate for permanent reconstruction. To encourage return to areas that were relatively safe, a transitional housing scheme was established. As is common in regular housing in Kenya, it was incremental in nature, taking SPHERE standards as the starting point. Because the affected were in some state of flux, not knowing whether they ultimately would be able to settle permanently on their transition site, or might have to move on again, the agencies involved decided that the housing solutions offered would have to be sufficiently flexible to leave owners with various long-term options of settlement. The concept of this was piloted by the Irish NGO GOAL in partnership with the UNHCR. Designs were based on the principles of:
• Rapid construction, in two days, in order not to loose too much time at the peak of agricultural activity; • Potential to upgrade transitional shelters to permanent housing • Ability to disassemble the house and rebuild it elsewhere; • Ability to disassemble the transitional shelter into components and re-use these in permanent housing; • Potential to expand from basic SPHERE standards in line with owner needs. (Aubrey, 2010) Figure 7. Shelter upgraded with timber off-cuts the housing sector that house construction often is an incremental process, as a result of which both the size and quality of houses improve over time. If, as often happens, inadequate resources are available for reconstruction, rather than aiming the available support at only part of those affected, it would normally be preferable to spread this support more widely and stimulate an incremental approach to reconstruction. In the case of Kenya, this started from the transitional shelter phase. But, as other projects in El Salvador, Turkey and Sri Lanka show, it can also be adopted to the reconstruction phase.
Assessing what makes people vulnerable
In order to be able to build back better, stakeholders in reconstruction need to understand what caused a hazard that occurred to become so disastrous for the people it affected. That involves not only studying why houses were vulnerable to collapse, but also what the underlying reasons for that were; these lie in the vulnerabilities of people themselves. What happened in the Alto Mayo, described alongside, explains why. An assessment of housing damage there did reveal that some building technologies were more resistant than others and that certain residents and local builders had the capabilities to construct well, however within those technology categories there were variations too. These were often caused because people, who were getting poorer, could no longer afford to build or maintain their houses well.
Vulnerabilities and capabilities (or assets) are key components of sustainable livelihoods analysis, which goes back to the thinking of Robert Chambers in the 1980s. The livelihoods approach puts people at the centre of development. Livelihoods analysis is helping us understand that poverty is multi-dimensional and that natural hazards are not the only risk poor people are facing. For some people, in fact, day-to-day survival may be of greater concern than the distant threat of a disaster happening. E.g., a study of the Karakoram region of Northern Pakistan from the 1980s found houses to be dangerously located on slopes. The owners were aware of the risks these locations posed, but opted to build there rather than using the little arable land they had for housing. Similarly, the urban poor often prefer to settle on more centrally located but dangerous sites close to income generating opportunities rather than go for safer land on the fringes. Unless we understand such constraints posed by people's livelihoods, and the risks that come with them, it becomes hard to reconstruct in a sustainable manner.
Changes in government policy can increase poverty and vulnerability
When a moderate earthquake struck the Alto Mayo of Peru in 1990, the region was in economic decline. Its main product was rice, but the government had disbanded the agency buying rice from farmers and failed to properly maintain the one major road that linked the region to the markets of the main cities on the coast. Incomes therefore declined and this reduced people's capabilities to build and maintain their houses well. This proved to be a major factor in the damage and casualties the earthquake caused. The region's inhabitants had become more vulnerable because their livelihoods had become negatively affected by external events, in this case a government failing to do its duty to them. What is more, when aid started to flow into the region in the aftermath of the disaster, it included a lot of imported rice, at a time when local stores were full to the brim of rice that farmers were unable to sell. This further worsened their potential for recovery, as it now became nearly impossible to sell rice locally.
Observations of the impact of the disaster, however, also showed that not everybody was equally affected. In addition, we need to be aware of the impact a reconstruction programme itself may have. Well meant interventions often distort local markets and can negatively affect livelihoods too, and in doing so exacerbate underlying vulnerabilities. We deal with this in component 6 below.
People participating from an early stage
People who participated in owner-driven reconstruction generally are more satisfied with the end results than those benefiting from donordriven reconstruction. (Duyne Barenstein, 2006 and Lyons, 2007) . The main reason for that is that they were more involved in the process, and therefore felt more that they owned it. For those familiar with the housing sector, that is not a surprising finding. That residents take most of the decisions that matter in popular housing was recognised as early as the 1970s, by authors such as John Turner (1976) who argued that it is the process of producing housing that is more important to people than the actual end product, since it builds their capacities and empowers them. In the same year, the first Habitat Conference in Vancouver made people's participation an important element of future housing policies and strategies. But housing agencies sometimes struggled to implement those. Turner put the dilemma they faced into one basic question: 'whose participation in whose decisions and whose actions'? There is ample evidence now that participation and the establishment of partnerships between various stakeholders can be really effective in solving deficiencies in housing and related services, whilst at the same time building the social and human assets of those involved (see e.g. Hamdi, 1995) .
Yet today, many reconstruction agencies are still struggling with Turner's dilemma. Humanitarian agencies are used to working in a 'supply mode', when providing relief, and it is hard for them to shift to a 'support mode', when they get to reconstruction. A wide range of modes of participation is practiced in reconstruction projects and programmes, corresponding to widely varying formal arrangements for community organisation and mobilisation, representation, responsibilities, accountability and rights. At one end of the spectrum, there are projects like the CRRP, described alongside that allow individuals to decide on a wide range of matters, whilst at the other end participation can be limited to the provision of labour or the selection of one amongst a few standard house designs. In order to empower people, to build their capabilities and social networks, which are all important component of vulnerability reduction, their participation needs to be ensured from an early stage in the reconstruction process.
And even in countries like Peru, where community participation is well embedded in
Making participation work at scale
The Community Recovery and Reconstruction Partnership (CRRP) was an initiative of the IFRC and UN-Habitat, with support of the SLRC, to achieve participatory port-tsunami reconstruction at scale, within Sri Lanka's Owner Driven Programme. It drew from the country's experience, some 20 years ago, of the million houses programme, which incorporated community action planning. The CRRP aimed to link reconstruction to long-term development and vulnerability reduction, and included elements of community capacity building and livelihoods support, though housing remained its major component. The programme reached some 11,000 households.
In terms of housing, though the CRRP insisted on complying with core government requirements, it remained very responsive to household preferences. It thus allowed for great diversity of plan, design and finishing, which contributed greatly to levels of user satisfaction. 
Including all people
The study of recent reconstruction experience highlights two important types of exclusion. The first has to do with the exclusion of people who have no property title from the reconstruction process; this may include owners who have no proof of ownership, but also tenants and squatters. This form of exclusion is clearly counter-developmental -and likely to increase vulnerability -since it is more often the poorer When participation disappears...
Looking back at the impact of multiple reconstruction projects in Peru, Guzmán Negrón (2010, pp. 323-327) concludes that participation can have long-term positive impacts, in that it leads to more equality and transparency, empowers individuals and communities, and gives them a feeling of being more responsible for their own development. Once that happens, individuals and communities often continue to improve their houses and services.
There have been cases, however, where either participation was inadequate or the state or the church have undermined it, at the time of reconstruction or afterwards. That happened, for instance, for electoral reasons, when food, equipment or infrastructure would be handed out without the population participating. As a result, in some places people have become more dependent, and traditional forms of participation, like the ayni are disappearing.
Land tenure issues need to be resolved
Some rural households in Kashmir, Pakistan, were renting land from landowners, on which the latter had allowed them to build a house. When the 2005 earthquake destroyed those houses that raised issues over who should receive the compensation, landowners or tenants. This was resolved by a policy directive in the final rural housing strategy of April 2006, which made tenants eligible for the grant subject to a 'no objection certificate' by the landowner.
Other tenure problems arose with landless people. Some of those were immigrants from Indian-administered Kashmir, others had lost their land in earthquakerelated landslides. ERRA issued a rural landless policy under which such households were issued an additional grant of $1,250 to buy land elsewhere. (Qazi, 2010) Weaker households can be accommodated
Many ODR reconstruction projects following the tsunami in Sri Lanka, organised the building process in groups of five to ten households. Completion phases in the construction process, against which payments were released, were examined for the group as a whole. Vulnerable households were allocated to groups with stronger neighbours, so that they could receive support in procurement, supervision and occasionally construction from more fortunate neighbours households who rent or squat and whose relative poverty will be exacerbated by such reconstruction processes. It is important to note that squatters and tenants are particularly vulnerable to disasters, in the case of squatters because they do not invest in better housing for fear of eviction, and in the case of tenants because rental housing often is of a poor standard. The opportunity of financial assistance from a variety of sources particularly after largescale disasters can be utilised by the authorities and reconstruction agencies to particularly target these categories. Countries such as Sri Lanka and Pakistan have supported the access of land by tenants and squatters either through the release of government land or via a land purchase grant. And in Aceh, the lack of secure tenure, or proof of it, was overcome by a community land adjudication process. The second type involves the exclusion of the weak from the benefits of reconstruction. The capture of power by local elites can be a problem with participation. The reconstruction projects studied all had built in some safe-guards against the exclusion of marginal households in a given community. However, these were often partial. Representative structures in community organisations did not require particular constituencies to be represented, and Figure 11 . Community members are being trained before carrying out planning activities thus were often dominated by local leaders. Community meetings in Muslim areas were often not attended by women, and their influence was therefore indirect. However, in almost all cases construction was realised on a group basis, with marginalised households being assigned to groups with stronger households. This helped to ensure that house completion by weaker households in a community did not fall as far behind as might have been expected.
Inclusion does require attention
Empowering people
Taking charge of a housing process can empower those involved (Turner, 1976) . The same applies to reconstruction. People who are empowered tend to be better able to cope with shocks and change. However, the decentralisation of decision making, e.g. putting people in charge of the procurement and construction of their own dwellings, requires sufficient information and technical support for it to be empowering. There is no power in being placed at the mercy of builders who understand construction far better than the owner. For PCR to be successful, agencies do need to provide sufficient information and technical support. The cases studied vary widely in the amounts of support provided by agencies, from one technical officer per 30 households in El Salvador, to one per 100 households in Sri Lanka's CRRP. Particularly where there is variety in design and houses are scattered, the former is a much better rule-ofthumb than the latter. Social networks are an important community asset, and often a crucial element in vulnerability reduction. Where they are strong, people will have traditions of mutual aid and greater sharing of knowledge and information. Such networks have often proven to be key to survival in the immediate aftermath of disasters, and a great help in reconstruction. However, they may
Giving cash alone does not empower people to rebuild adequate houses
India has a long history of supporting people with cash to rebuild their houses, both with social housing programmes and after disasters. However, this has not necessarily empowered people, whose choices are constrained by institutionalised systems that do not value their traditional knowledge and skills. Cash grants handed out after disasters without accompanying technical support are not sufficient to empower people to build back better. And in some cases, especially in social housing, there is a clear discrepancy between the amounts of cash allocated for building a new house and the specifications that people are expected to follow, which further dis-empowers them. Amongst the relatively recent large reconstruction programmes in India, only the one after the earthquake in Gujarat followed an approach that combined cash grants with other measures meant to empower people, e.g. a choice of options and adequate technical support to improve upon local building practices. Notwithstanding the success of that approach, it was not repeated in Tamil Nadu after the tsunami, nor in Kashmir after the earthquake, because it was not institutionalised in policy.
(Duyne Barenstein and Iyengar, 2010) 
Insist on Independent monitoring and treatment of grievances
Post-tsunami reconstruction in Sri Lanka provides a rare example of a national reconstruction programme that incorporated an appeals mechanism for individuals who were concerned about their treatment by state actors. This Disaster Relief Monitoring Unit functioned as part of the Sri Lanka Human Rights Commission, and was able to identify and correct procedural errors and instances of local corruption. This was supported by a campaign of rights education, and claims were handled by an independent ombudsman.
After allegations of corruption, RADA also enforced district grievance committees, chaired by the district secretary, which in Ampara district alone received 12,000 complaints. Some major co-funding projects, like the CRRP and CfRR, established their own grievance mechanisms, which, being internal, were judged to be less efficient. (Hidellage and Usoof, 2010) 
Strengthening social capital is important too
The Spanish and Salvadorian Red Cross helped 9 rural communities rebuild after major earthquakes in 2001. A key component of their support was the provision of social promoters by the Salvadorian Red Cross. They lived within the communities and worked to strengthen the communal development organisations (ADESCOS) present in each one. They also helped to create trust between the communities and the Red Cross office. They were able to quickly help solve problems, and often to prevent these from getting more serious. (Ferrer Calvo, with Herreros and Mata, 2010) With high levels of participation, people can feel empowered and confident have weakened as a result of a disaster, with members getting scattered or killed. Social mobilisation is as important as technical support to the success of PCR, as it helps to rebuild and strengthen relations within communities, and between communities and agencies. In El Salvador, the daily presence of community mobilisers was an important factor in the success of a reconstruction project, whilst in Peru, it was found that mobilisers needed to live within communities to do a better job.
Accountability is an element of empowerment. In the wake of a disaster, the pressures on donors and NGOs to be accountable for fixed sums within limited timeframes undermines their concerns for the long-term development impact of their work on the ground. Even within ODR programmes, this militates against decentralised decision making and control. None of the countries studied had made agency accountability an obligation, nor had they established appeal mechanisms for people concerned over their contracts with agencies. The absence of mechanisms established from above does not absolve agencies involved in PCR of their duty of accountability, not just to their donors, but also to the people they are working with. They should establish their own ways for doing so, which may vary with context, but should be based on the principles of transparency, free and fair sharing of information including financial, and joint monitoring and evaluating of results.
Incorporating livelihoods
As explained in point 2 above, and as the Alto Mayo case shows, the root cause of much of the vulnerability, suffering and destruction experienced during disasters is poverty. Both
Livelihoods and housing support should go hand in hand
In January 1999, a moderate earthquake struck the coffee growing region in the west of Colombia. Though only modest, it caused much damage to houses and coffee infrastructure, showing the underlying vulnerabilities of communities. The coffee growers, though, were well organised and self-reliant, and through the Coffee Growers Federation, many local branches were used to providing social, welfare, marketing and material support to members. Following the quake, this structure could rapidly turn to relief, and when the relief phase came to an end, the government's official reconstruction agency, FOREC, invited the Coffee Growers Federation as a partner in rural reconstruction. The local organisations than undertook assessments of damage and needs, assisted by engineers. The Federation had no experience with reconstruction, so it decided to establish a reconstruction fund (FORECAFE) in support of households, but that households would be responsible for the planning and construction of their houses and infrastructure themselves. FORECAFE was made up of the initial FOREC contribution, savings from members, and donations from within Colombia and abroad. The fund offered a basic grant of $4,000 for rebuilding a house, and an optional loan of a further $1,000. In addition, grants of $2,000 and further loans of $3,000 were available to rebuild infrastructure. A team of engineers hired by the Federation helped householders to draft individual house plans and specifications. The Federation also provided them with lots of information, e.g. on earthquake resistant construction and building maintenance. Households could then choose whether to build the house themselves, hire local builders, or combine those approaches. Money to build was paid in instalments, with engineers controlling quality, before subsequent instalments were approved. The coffee growers were very resourceful in using their social networks, salvaging components from damaged houses, devising designs that combined traditional building methods with e.g. bamboo, with more modern ones using bricks or blocks, and in negotiating down local market prices. This meant that most households were able to extend their modest grants and subsidies a long way, combine them with any savings, and not only to fully rebuild their houses, but also related infrastructure services, and the coffee infrastructure upon which their livelihoods depended.
The first two phases of FORECAFE reconstructed 9,800 houses; 4,700 structures for coffee production; and 2,131 works of infrastructure for housing or coffee production, which enabled thousands of people to rebuild their livelihoods. The programme as a whole also generated an estimated 10,000 direct or indirect jobs in the local economy. In a third phase, 490 schools, 80 water supply schemes and 70 health centres were repaired or reconstructed, plus a variety of other facilities and services, virtually all of which helped to improve local livelihoods. (Lizarralde, 2010) Livelihoods and housing support should go hand in hand can help asses what has happened to markets as a result of a disaster and how they could be restored (Albu, 2010) . Besides, the house itself generates forward linkages, because it may offer a place to earn a living, or a store for produce to be marketed. The location of the house itself is important for livelihoods. If houses have to be relocated following a disaster, it is crucial to assess the livelihoods consequences of that. After the 2004 tsunami in Sri Lanka, for instance, many affected families were offered relocation inland, quite far from the sea, but the many fishermen amongst them were very reluctant to move there. Finally, if people participate in decision making processes, capacity building, construction etc. that has livelihoods consequences too. If they have to contribute considerable amounts of finance and labour, that can have severe knock-on effects on livelihoods. When projects require building works to be finished, before releasing subsidies, or that work is completed within very tight donor deadlines, that may force people to liquidate savings or into debt. Some of the skills gained in the process, on the other hand, might result in better income generation.
Unfortunately, most reconstruction programmes so far involve little holistic thinking.
It is preferable to build back with improved local technologies
An earthquake that occurred in the Alto Mayo province of Peru destroyed eight out of ten houses in some areas; these were mostly built with rammed earth (tapial) or adobe, by migrants that had moved into the region from the High Andes. People observed that houses built out of quincha, having a timber frame with woven cane and reed panels plastered on both sides with earth, had generally proven to be much more resistant. Practical Action, an NGO already working in the area, was asked to help people rebuild. Initially, most wanted to rebuild with modern materials, such as bricks or concrete, which they perceived to be stronger, however that would have only helped a limited number of households within the project budget. Besides, the materials used for quincha were available locally, allowing people to rebuild quicker. Practical Action, local people and their builders, tried out various ways of further improving the quincha technology on a community building, e.g. preserving the timber, placing the frame in concrete footings and strengthening the connections between structural elements. Practical Action also trained local builders to assist residents with rebuilding their houses in improved quincha. It also produced a range of information materials, including drawings and manuals, for the builders to use. House designs evolved from participatory design workshops. An external evaluation a few years after the project found that improved quincha had spread much beyond the project. Two factors were key in that. First, another moderate earthquake occurred a year after the first one, which left the houses and community buildings constructed in improved quincha intact, where many others collapsed; that gave people more confidence in the technology. Besides, a lot of people found out about improved quincha from the local builders trained by the project; this dissemination by word of mouth had much more impact than the distribution of leaflets and other published materials. (Lowe, undated) This may be a consequence, to an extent, of the cluster approach adopted by major agencies after reconstruction, which may force them into sectoral boxes. Most of the cases analysed prioritised housing over livelihoods, and most of those few that did offer support for income generation did so only after housing was completed. There is evidence in some cases that this approach can lead to a diversion of housing funds to livelihoods activities, out of necessity, and that people then struggle to complete their house to the required standard. A positive exception to this finding is the case of Colombia, described alongside.
Building back better
'Building Back Better' is high on the agenda of many agencies involved in reconstruction. It is defined by most agencies as reconstructing houses that are more resistant to disasters than previously dominant types. For many agencies, that concern for quality is a key reason to go for reconstruction that is designed and controlled by architects and engineers, and built by contractors, that is DDR. We have argued above, though, that with adequate support and information, people can be trained and empowered to take charge of their own reconstruction processes and realise adequate quality. We have also stated that, in order to achieve true resilience to shocks and change, it is not enough to rebuild housing to a safer standard, but that people's livelihoods and local markets need rebuilding too. It is also important for agencies to consider the long-term adoption of the ways of reconstruction they are promoting. Standards for reconstruction tend to vary considerably between disasters and across projects, often as a direct consequence of available aid. If standards are set too high, stimulated perhaps by large flows of aid after disasters, there is a real risk that these may not be maintained in the future, Improved vernacular technologies are the ones most likely to be taken up at scale when people need to expand their houses, or their children need to build new ones. There is ample evidence that they may then revert to their traditional ways of building and become more vulnerable again. Those agencies that will have learned from the housing sector, as suggested in point 1, will know how poor people tend to build and what they can afford. If reconstruction deviates too much from that, it will only solve the problem of housing vulnerability in the short term.
Studying housing and what makes people vulnerable (see point 2), however, very often can direct stakeholders towards vernacular designs and technologies that have proven in practice to be relatively more resistant. There still may be some inherent weaknesses, but these can often be overcome through participatory technology development, at little extra cost. Using skills and materials that are locally available as a starting point makes PCR easier, reduces the need for additional training into new technologies, and is usually cheaper for all concerned. And there is evidence, e.g. in the case of improved quincha in Peru or dhajji dewari in Pakistan that those improved vernacular technologies are the ones most likely to be taken up at scale.
